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“[I]ts power seems inescapable—but then, so did the divine right of kings.”
— Ursula K. Le Guin1 
Social media companies are in Congress’s sights. In May 2016, in the wake of allegations that Facebook work-
ers had suppressed pro-conservative viewpoints and links while injecting liberal stories into the newly introduced 
Trending Topics section, Senator John Thune sent a letter to Mark Zuckerberg demanding, among other things, a 
copy of the company’s guidelines for choosing Trending Topics, a list of all news stories removed or injected into 
Trending Topics, and information about what steps the company would take to “hold the responsible individuals 
accountable.”2 Facebook complied, with Zuckerberg himself meeting with lawmakers. 
During the recent hearings before the Senate and House intelligence committees on Russian interference in the 
2016 presidential campaign, Senator Dianne Feinstein told the general counsels of Facebook, Google, and Twitter 
— whose CEOs were conspicuously absent — “You bear this responsibility. You’ve created these platforms. And 
now they’re being misused. And you have to be the ones to do something about it. Or we will.”3 Despite intensive 
lobbying efforts by these companies, both individually and through their collective trade association,4 legislation 
imposing new restrictions on how they operate is, “[f]or the first time in years, . . . being discussed seriously in Wash-
† Doctoral candidate in philosophy, New York University. Visiting researcher at Harvard Law School (2017); Bigelow Fellow and Lec-
turer in Law, University of Chicago Law School (2014–2016); law clerk to the Honorable Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit Diane P. 
Wood (2013–2014); Google Global Ethics and Compliance team (2007–2010). The following borrows from and builds on prior work, 
including Heather Whitney, Does the Packingham Ruling Presage Greater Government Control over Search Results? Or Less?, Tech. 
& Marketing L. Blog (June 22, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/06/does-the-packingham-ruling-presage-greater-gov-
ernment-control-over-search-results-or-less-guest-blog-post.htm; and Heather M. Whitney & Robert Mark Simpson, Search Engines, 
Free Speech Coverage, and the Limits of Analogical Reasoning, in Free Speech in the Digital Age (Susan Brison & Kath Gelber eds., 
forthcoming 2018). For helpful feedback, my sincerest thanks to Adam Shmarya Lovett, Chris Franco, Daniel Viehoff, David Pozen, 
Eric Goldman, Jameel Jaffer, Jane Friedman, Katie Fallow, Neil Martin, Robert Hopkins, and Robert Mark Simpson. Additional thanks 
to David Pozen, who also served as editor for this paper, and to Knight First Amendment Institute interns Joseph Catalanotto and Sam 
Matthews for editorial assistance.
1 Ursula K. Le Guin, Speech in Acceptance of the National Book Foundation Medal for Distinguished Contribution to American Letters 
(Nov. 19, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/nov/20/ursula-k-le-guin-national-book-awards-speech.
2 Letter from Sen. John Thune to Mark Zuckerberg 2–3 (May 10, 2016), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/fe5b7b75-
8d53-44c3-8a20-6b2c12b0970d/C5CF587E2778E073A80A79E2A6F73705.fb-letter.pdf [hereinafter Thune Letter].
3 Craig Timberg et al., Fiery Exchanges on Capitol Hill as Lawmakers Scold Facebook, Google and Twitter, Wash. Post (Nov. 1, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/11/01/fiery-exchanges-on-capitol-hill-as-lawmakers-scold-facebook-google-
and-twitter (emphasis added). 
4 See Mark Bergen et al., Google, Facebook, Twitter Scramble to Hold Washington at Bay, Bloomberg (Oct. 10, 2017), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-10/google-facebook-and-twitter-scramble-to-hold-washington-at-bay; Ben Brody & Bill Allison, 
Lobbying Group for Facebook and Google to Pitch Self-Regulation of Ads, Bloomberg (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-10-24/lobby-group-for-facebook-google-to-pitch-self-regulation-of-ads; Sarah Frier & Bill Allison, Facebook Fought 
Rules That Could Have Exposed Fake Russian Ads, Bloomberg (Oct. 4, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-04/
facebook-fought-for-years-to-avoid-political-ad-disclosure-rules.
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ington.”5 As one reporter put it, “In 2008, it was Wall Street bankers. In 2017, tech workers are the world’s villain.”6  
That Bay Area tech companies are having something of a PR crisis is clear.7 And in the rough and tumble of politics, 
that these companies would meet with and appease legislators is no great surprise. But if Congress does decide to 
get tough, how credible and wide-ranging is the regulatory threat, under current First Amendment jurisprudence?
Some prominent commentators claim that Facebook is analogous to a newspaper and that its handling of a feature 
like Trending Topics is analogous to a newspaper’s editorial choices.8 As a result, these commentators find con-
gressional scrutiny of such matters to be constitutionally problematic. Moreover, the editorial analogy has been a 
remarkably effective shield for these tech companies in litigation. In a series of lower court cases, Google and others 
have argued that their decisions concerning their platforms—for example, what sites to list (or delist) and in what 
order, who can buy ads and where to place them, and what users to block or permanently ban—are analogous to 
the editorial decisions of publishers. And like editorial decisions, they argue, these decisions are protected “speech” 
under the First Amendment. While mostly wielded against small-fry, often pro se plaintiffs, courts have tended to 
accept this analogy wholesale. 
Large consequences hinge on whether the various choices companies like Facebook and Google make are indeed 
analogous to editorial “speech.” The answer will partly determine whether and how the state can respond to current 
challenges ranging from the proliferation of fake news to high levels of market concentration to the lack of ad trans-
parency. Furthermore, algorithmic discrimination and the discrimination facilitated by these platforms’ structures 
affect people’s lives today and no doubt will continue to do so.9 But if these algorithms and outputs are analogous to 
5 Timberg et al., supra note 3. In addition, “[i]n a rare act of unanimity, all current FEC commissioners voted [this fall] to reopen public 
comments” on the Federal Election Commission’s rule exempting Facebook from its political advertising disclosure regulations. Frier & 
Allison, supra note 4. Since 2011, Facebook has asked for exemptions, arguing that “political ad disclosures could hinder free speech” 
and that the FEC “should not stand in the way of innovation.” Id.
6 Erin Griffith, The Other Tech Bubble, Wired (Dec. 16, 2017), http://www.wired.com/story/the-other-tech-bubble. 
7 Growing disenchantment with Bay Area tech companies is certainly not limited to concerns about fake news and foreign propaganda. 
From their association with massive economic inequality and neighborhood gentrification, to purported attempts at union-busting at 
Tesla, to sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination both within these companies and facilitated through their platforms, to the 
recent uproar over Apple’s iPhone-slowdown “misunderstanding,” the last few years have done much to erode the utopian view some 
once held of Silicon Valley. See, e.g., Brady Dale, The Economic Justice Fight Inside Silicon Valley’s Commuter Buses, Observer (Apr. 
6, 2017), http://observer.com/2017/04/teamsters-facebook-google-linkedin; Megan Rose Dickey, In Light of Discrimination Concerns, 
Uber and Lyft Defend Their Policies to Show Rider Names and Photos, TechCrunch (Dec. 29, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/12/29/
uber-lyft-respond-al-franken-about-discrimination; Zac Estrada, Tesla Hit with Labor Complaint on Behalf of Fired Factory Workers, 
Verge (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.theverge.com/2017/10/26/16553554/tesla-labor-complaint-fired-factory-workers-elon-musk; Jordan 
McMahon, Apple Had Way Better Options Than Slowing Down Your iPhone, Wired (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.wired.com/story/apple-
iphone-battery-slow-down; Alexandra Simon-Lewis, What Is Silicon Valley’s Problem with Women?, Wired (June 12, 2017), http://www.
wired.co.uk/article/tesla-sexism-lawsuit-harassment-uber.
8 See Hope King, Is Facebook Protected Under the First Amendment?, CNN (May 12, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/12/media/
facebook-first-amendment/index.html; Hope King & Brian Stelter, Senate Demands Answers from Facebook, CNN (May 10, 2016), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/10/technology/facebook-news-senate/index.html; Jeff John Roberts, Like It or Not, Facebook Has the 
Right to Choose Your News, Fortune (May 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/10/facebook-first-amendment.
9 See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Making Algorithms Accountable, ProPublica (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.propublica.org/article/making-algo-
rithms-accountable (reviewing mounting concerns over algorithmic secrecy and “bias”); Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimina-
tion by Customers, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 223 (2016) (discussing regulation of online discrimination of customers); Nancy Leong & Aaron Bel-
zer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 Geo. L.J. 1271 (2017) (arguing that existing 
public accommodation laws should evolve to regulate businesses in the online platform economy); cf. Heather M. Whitney, The Regula-
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the decisions the New York Times makes on what to publish, then attempts to extend antidiscrimination laws to deal 
with such discrimination will face an onslaught of potentially insuperable constitutional challenges. In short, these 
companies’ deployment of the editorial analogy in the First Amendment context poses a major hurdle to government 
intervention.
Whether, or to what extent, the editorial analogy should work as a shield against looming legislation and litigation 
for companies like Facebook and Google is something this historical moment demands we carefully consider. My 
primary aim in this paper is to do just that. I will engage critically with, and ultimately raise questions about, the 
near-automatic application of the editorial analogy. The core takeaways are these: (1) we should be cognizant of 
the inherent limitations of analogical reasoning generally and of the editorial analogy specifically; (2) whether these 
companies’ various outputs should receive coverage as First Amendment “speech” is far from clear, both descrip-
tively and normatively;10 (3) the proposition that regulations compelling these companies to add content (disclaim-
ers, links to competitors, and so on) compel the companies to speak is also far from clear; and, finally and most 
crucially, (4) given the limits of analogical reasoning, our future debates about First Amendment coverage should 
focus less on analogy and more on what actually matters — the normative commitments that undergird free speech 
theory and how our choices either help or hinder their manifestations.
To that end, I start by reviewing some of the cases in which the editorial analogy has been successfully deployed. 
Next, I lay the groundwork for rethinking the editorial analogy — first, by analyzing its internal weaknesses, and sec-
ond, by raising other potentially compelling analogical frames. Each new analogy raises far knottier questions than 
I can address here, so I will briefly mention only a few, ending with the analogy brought to life by the Court’s recent 
language in Packingham.11 There, the Court, either strategically or recklessly, “equate[d] the entirety of the internet 
with public streets and parks”12 and declared it “clear” that “cyberspace” and “social media in particular” are now 
“the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views.”13 The Court found social media to be “the 
modern public square”14 and stated that it is a “fundamental principle of the First Amendment . . . that all persons 
have access” to such a forum.15 This language casts doubt on whether the editorial analogy will be successful going 
forward. Its reliance on highly abstract characterizations also serves as a lesson. We should address First Amend-
ment coverage questions through the lens of normative theory and not through a collection of ill-suited analogies. 
tion of Discrimination by Individuals in the Market, 2017 U. Chi. Legal F. 537 (2017) (laying the groundwork for thinking through whether, 
descriptively and normatively, consumers have a right to discriminate online and online companies a right to help them); Heather M. 
Whitney, Markets, Rights, and Discrimination by Customers, 102 Iowa L. Rev. Online 346 (2017) (responding to Bartlett and Gulati).
10 See generally Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry (1982) (describing the question of which classes of communi-
cative acts warrant free speech protection as the question of coverage). 
11 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
12 Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
13 Id. at 1735.
14 Id. at 1737. 
15 Id. at 1735. 
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I. The Editorial Analogy in Litigation
Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc. is the case in which a lower court has most fully explained why, in its view, the editorial 
analogy applies to a search engine’s outputs.16 The plaintiffs, New York residents and self-described “promoters of 
democracy in China,” alleged that Baidu, the dominant Chinese search engine, intentionally delisted their pro-de-
mocracy websites from its search results in the United States at the behest of the Chinese government.17 And in so 
doing, they further alleged, Baidu violated their First Amendment rights. Baidu replied that its listing decisions were 
its protected speech. The Southern District of New York agreed, finding that “First Amendment jurisprudence all but 
compels the conclusion that Plaintiffs’ suit must be dismissed.”18 With no attention paid to the claim that Baidu was 
acting on behalf of the Chinese government, the court saw the relevant precedent as Miami Herald Publishing Co. 
v. Tornillo.19 There, the U.S. Supreme Court found unconstitutional a statute that required newspapers to provide 
political candidates a right of reply to critical editorials.20 The court in Baidu also saw Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston as an extension of Tornillo, equally applicable to Baidu.21 In Hurley, the 
Court ruled that requiring parade organizers to permit a pro-LGBT group to participate would entail unconstitution-
ally compelling the parade organizers to speak.22  
The Baidu court’s holding followed directly from its analogical reasoning. It saw Baidu as organizing information, 
which it thought sufficient to make the relevant analogy a “newspaper editor’s judgment of which . . . stories to run.”23 
The Supreme Court previously found a newspaper’s judgment of which stories to run protected “speech” and struck 
down as compelled speech a requirement that it include content that went against that judgment. Thus, analogizing 
Baidu to a newspaper, Baidu’s judgments about which sites to list were also protected “speech” and requiring Baidu 
to include sites against its wishes would be unconstitutional compelled speech, too.
The editorial analogy again won out, this time for Google, in e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc.24  e-ventures 
is a search engine optimization (SEO) firm. Such firms seek to improve the visibility of client websites in organic 
(i.e., non-paid) search results. Clients like this because the higher their websites in organic rankings, the heavier 
the flow of traffic to their sites, which in turn enables them to sell advertising space on their sites at higher rates. 
Search engine companies are not big fans of SEO firms — they see them as trying to game the system for unpaid 
rankings.25 More to the point, when SEO firms are successful, it means that companies spend a portion of their 
advertising budgets with the SEO firms and not with Google for paid placement in search results. As a result, a 
16 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
17 Id. at 435.
18 Id. at 436.
19 Id. at 436–43 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).
20 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258.
21 Baidu, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437–442 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)). 
22 For an interesting criticism of the Hurley Court’s analysis, see John Gardner, Case Note, Hurley and South Boston Allied War Veter-
ans Council v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-Sexual Group of Boston, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 1 Int’l J. Discrimination & L. 283 (1996).
23 Baidu, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438.
24 No. 2:14-cv-646-FtM-PAM-CM, 2017 WL 2210029 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).
25 Note the oddity here. Search engine companies don’t like SEO firms because they don’t like how those firms boost their clients’ sites 
in the search engine’s own rankings. This fact — that search engine companies cannot fully control their own results — makes it harder 
to then call those rankings the company’s speech.
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perpetual game of cat and mouse ensues.26 Apparently unable to tweak its search algorithm in a way it liked, Goo-
gle instead manually delisted 231 websites belonging to e-ventures clients.27 e-ventures attempted to reach out to 
Google through several channels, with the hopes of getting the sites relisted, but was unsuccessful. As a result, it 
filed suit, at which point Google relisted the sites.
In its suit, e-ventures alleged that the delisting constituted unfair competition under the Lanham Act, tortious inter-
ference with business relations, and a violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.28 e-ventures 
also alleged that Google’s statements about its search results — that “Google search results are a reflection of the 
content publicly available on the web” and that “[i]t is Google’s policy not to censor search results” — were false 
and deceptive in light of its delisting practices.29 Google responded by asserting, among other things, that e-ven-
tures’ claims were overridden by the First Amendment, as Google’s search results were its editorial judgments and 
opinions.30 While the court did not grant Google’s motion to dismiss, it ultimately agreed with Google at summary 
judgment that the First Amendment protects its delisting decisions.31 And the court did so by squarely analogizing 
Google to a publisher and its judgments about what to list or delist to a publisher’s decision about what to publish.32
That Google’s actions were commercial and arguably anticompetitive did not matter. That Google was alleged to 
have made deceptive statements did not matter. On the contrary, the court expressly opined that Google’s free 
speech rights protect its listing and delisting decisions “whether they are fair or unfair, or motivated by profit or 
altruism.”33 The court’s conclusion that if Google’s results were speech, unfair competition laws could not apply is 
deeply problematic and difficult to square with the obvious fact that laws addressing unfair and deceptive advertis-
ing prohibit certain speech all the time.34 This conclusion underscores the editorial analogy’s powerful influence and 
what its successful use puts at stake.
26 See Alexia Tsotsis, Google’s Algorithmic Cat and Mouse Game [Infographic], TechCrunch (Mar. 23, 2011), http://techcrunch.
com/2011/03/23/googles-algorithmic-cat-and-mouse-game-infographic (illustrating this game).
27 e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2016).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1270–71. You might notice that this latter argument is similar in spirit to the one made by Senate Commerce Committee Chair-
man John Thune when writing Zuckerberg about Facebook’s allegedly liberal-biased Trending Topics. See Thune Letter, supra note 2, 
at 1–2 (“If Facebook presents its Trending Topics section as the result of a neutral, objective algorithm, but it is in fact subjective and fil-
tered to support or suppress particular political viewpoints, Facebook’s assertion that it maintains a ‘platform for people and perspectives 
from across the political spectrum’ misleads the public.” (quoting Josh Constine & Sarah Buhr, Facebook Now Directly Denies Report of 
Biased Trends, Says There’s No Evidence, TechCrunch (May 9, 2016), http://techcrunch.com/2016/05/09/facebook-workers)). A similar 
move has been made against Yelp. Companies have alleged that Yelp deleted their positive reviews, leaving only the negatives, and 
then blackmailed them into paying for ads. Given that Yelp portrays itself as a neutral platform that accurately reflects the reviews of us-
ers (indeed, that’s why people use it), this would also seem like a clear case of false advertising if the allegations are true. But sometimes 
courts, misapplying Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, have failed to see this. See, e.g., Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011 WL 
5079526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011). Thankfully, however, not all courts have made this mistake. See Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., 175 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). For more on this problem, compare Rebecca Tushnet, A Cry for Yelp, Rebecca Tushnet’s 43(B)log 
(Nov. 1, 2011), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2011/11/cry-for-yelp.html (agreeing with me), with Eric Goldman, Yelp Gets Complete Win 
in Advertiser “Extortion” Case — Levitt v. Yelp, Tech. & Marketing L. Blog (Oct. 26, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/10/
yelp_gets_compl.htm (disagreeing).
30 e-ventures Worldwide, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 1273–74.
31 e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2:14-cv-00646-PAM-CM (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017), 2017 WL 2210029, at *4.
32 Id. (“A search engine is akin to a publisher, whose judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are absolutely protected 
by the First Amendment.” (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974))). 
33 Id. 
34 The California Attorney General’s Office has also set out arguments for why Google search results can both be covered by the First 
Amendment and still be open to antitrust scrutiny. See Paula Lauren Gibson, Does the First Amendment Immunize Google’s Search 
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That said, while the editorial analogy has proved potent in lower court cases, there is still time to rethink it. First, 
the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in. As I mentioned before and will discuss below, the Court’s most recent com-
ments in this area come in Packingham.35 If we take the majority at its word, that case suggests that it is an analogy 
to the public square, and not to a publisher, that ought to guide First Amendment thinking about social media. Sec-
ond, plaintiffs in these prior cases were much more modestly resourced than the search titans they opposed. Some 
plaintiffs proceeded pro se. As a practical matter, this means that lower courts have been under little pressure to 
interrogate the cursory analogical-reasoning rationales that favored the defendants. 
But this too might change. In what Yelp’s vice president of public policy described as the “most significant en-
forcement event in consumer tech antitrust” since the action against Microsoft in 2000,36 Google was fined a re-
cord-breaking €2.4 billion by European regulators in June 2017 for abusing its market dominance by giving an 
illegal advantage to its own products while demoting rivals in its comparison shopping service, Google Shopping.37 
While EU actions do not ensure any movement domestically, they can bring to light information that further tarnishes 
Silicon Valley’s reputation and thus contributes to the erosion of the basis for its companies’ exceptional treatment 
to date. Within the United States, moreover, Yelp and TripAdvisor have repeatedly argued that Google deliberately 
diverts users searching for their sites to Google-owned alternatives. Google has said that some of these results are 
the result of bugs, but its competitors argue otherwise.38 It is at least possible that a major (and well-funded) lawsuit 
in the United States — and with it, a vigorous battle over First Amendment coverage, the editorial analogy, and 
unfair competition laws — may yet materialize.
 
II. The Limits of the Editorial Analogy
The analogical argument works something like this: A does x and merits treatment y. B does x. Therefore, B is anal-
ogous to A, and B also merits treatment y. We can challenge arguments of this form in several ways. First, internal 
to the argument, we can question the relationship between doing x and getting treatment y. We cannot assume that 
doing x always merits treatment y. Indeed, we cannot assume that doing x has anything to do with why treatment y 
is merited. An example will help make this more concrete: Take the action of eating a sundae without permission. If 
I work at the ice cream shop from which I took that sundae, a reprimand from my employer might be merited. But 
say instead that I’m a professor. We likely think that it would be absurd for my employer to reprimand me for eating 
a sundae without permission. In both cases I did the same thing — ate a sundae without permission — but addi-
tional facts change what treatment we think that same action merits.39 Put simply, even when A and B have some 
similarities, there can be relevant dissimilarities between them that renders treatment y appropriate for one but not 
the other. 
Engine Search Results from Government Antitrust Scrutiny?, 23 Competition: J. Antirust & Unfair Comp. L. Sec. St. B. Cal. 125, 136 
(2014); see also supra note 29. 
35 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
36 Klint Finley, Google’s Big EU Fine Isn’t Just About The Money, Wired (Jun 27, 2017), http://www.wired.com/story/google-big-eu-fine.
37 Josie Cox, Google Hit with Record EU Fine over “Unfair” Shopping Searches, Independent (June 27, 2017), http://www.indepen-
dent.co.uk/news/business/news/google-eu-fine-latest-competition-shopping-searches-prepare-online-european-commission-re-
sults-a7809886.html.
38 Mark Bergen, Google Says Local Search Results That Buried Rivals Yelp, TripAdvisor Is Just a Bug, Recode (Nov. 24, 2015), http://
www.recode.net/2015/11/24/11620920/google-says-local-search-result-that-buried-rivals-yelp-tripadvisor. 
39 Thanks to Jane Friedman for help with this example. 
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A second challenge, and one I would call external, is to propose a different analogy. Why analogize B to A and not B 
to C? Consider that newspapers (A) provide people information (x) and that requiring newspapers to provide differ-
ent information (for example, a right of reply) may be struck down as compelling them to speak (merits treatment y). 
Search engines (B) also provide people information (x). As a result, search engines are analogous to newspapers 
(A), and so we might think that requiring a search engine to provide different information should similarly be struck 
down as compelling it to speak (merits treatment y). Now consider an alternative analogy. Law schools (C) provide 
information (x) by hosting and organizing recruitment fairs, to which they invite a limited number of employers. 
Requiring law schools to allow military recruiters into such fairs and to give them equal access to students does 
not compel the schools to say anything (they remain free to protest the military’s policies), so this requirement is 
constitutional (merits treatment z).40 Search engines (B) provide information (x) via their rankings, in which a limited 
number of sites are included. Therefore, requiring search engines to allow sites into those rankings and to give them 
equal access to the search engine’s users similarly does not compel the search engine to speak (it remains free to 
protest the competitor’s speech). Thus, that requirement is constitutional as well (merits treatment z). Treatments y 
and z are incompatible. Yet, we can construct analogies that call for search engines to get both. That’s a problem.
Like all analogies, the editorial analogy is vulnerable on both the internal and external front. 
 A.  Internal Weaknesses of the Analogy
In a white paper paid for by Google at the same time that the Federal Trade Commission was investigating whether 
the company had abused its market dominance,41 Eugene Volokh and Donald Falk argue that Google’s organic 
search results are fully protected speech and, as a result, are insulated from antitrust scrutiny.42 Relatedly, they ar-
gue that requiring Google to change its search results (for example, by placing Yelp higher) would unconstitutionally 
compel Google to speak in much the same way that a right-of-reply law would unconstitutionally compel a news-
paper editor to speak.43 In making their argument, the authors rely heavily on the editorial analogy. As they put it, 
companies like Google are “analogous to newspapers and book publishers” in that they both “convey a wide range 
of information.”44 They claim that search results are also analogous to editorial publications, as both involve choices 
about “how to rank and organize content,”45 “what should be presented to users,”46 and “what constitutes useful 
information.”47 This description of (some of) what Google does is accurate. But, crucially, these analogies do not 
substantiate the authors’ two claims—namely, that (1) search engines and search results merit the same treatment 
as publishers and editorial judgments for First Amendment purposes, and (2) requiring Google to modify its search 
results would compel Google to speak. 
40 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006).
41 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Volokh Argues Google Has a Free Speech Right to Determine Search Results, ABA J. (May 14, 
2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_prof_volokh_argues_google_has_a_free_speech_right_to_determine_search_r; 
Thomas Catan & Amir Efrati, Feds to Launch Probe of Google, Wall St. J. (June 24, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405
2702303339904576403603764717680.
42 Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055364. 
43 Id. at 21. 
44 Id. at 27. 
45 Id. at 11.
46 Id. at 14.
47 Id. at 27. 
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Let’s start with the first claim — that Google is analogous to a publisher because it, too, conveys a wide range of 
information. Now consider the application of that argument to a familiar saying: “Actions speak louder than words.” 
We say this because actions convey a wide range of information, often more truthful information than is conveyed 
through speech alone. Yet we certainly do not think that whenever people act, they are analogous to newspaper 
editors under the First Amendment and that their actions are therefore covered as speech. Thus, we can conclude 
that conveying a wide range of information is not sufficient for being treated like a publisher under the First Amend-
ment.48 And given this, it straightforwardly follows that pointing out that Google conveys a wide range of information 
does not yet tell us whether Google should be treated like a publisher under the First Amendment. 
Now consider the layout of a grocery store. There are good reasons that pharmacies are in the back,49 that certain 
brands are at eye level,50 and that candy is near the checkout.51 All those choices convey a wide range of infor-
mation to consumers. Do we think that for purposes of First Amendment analysis, grocery stores are therefore 
analogous to publishers, because grocery stores convey a wide range of information through their organizing of 
products? Is the layout of the grocery store analogous to an editorial for purposes of speech coverage? My guess 
is most people think the answer is an obvious no.
If any individual or organization who satisfies this “conveys a wide range of information” criterion is deemed anal-
ogous to newspaper and book publishers for First Amendment purposes, then we have misunderstood how liberal 
political theory and free speech theory work. At the heart of liberal political theory is the idea that everyone is free 
to live according to their own ideals, so long as doing so does not unduly interfere with other people’s ability to do 
likewise. As a result, the government can only legitimately restrict people’s freedom when it is necessary to prevent 
harm or secure the demands of justice. The idea at the heart of liberal free speech theory is that when it comes 
to certain communicative acts, a commitment to individual freedom isn’t enough and must be bolstered by extra 
protections that make what counts as “speech” less liable to regulation than similarly harmful or unjust non-speech. 
This doesn’t mean that the government can willy-nilly regulate whatever it wants except for speech. It must always 
show the harm or injustice that results from the object of regulation. Instead, liberal free speech theory says that reg-
ulating a subset of those harms or injustices — those that come directly from “speech” — should be more difficult, 
even acknowledging that they are harmful or unjust.52 But this whole scheme presupposes that what gets covered 
as “speech” for this purpose is limited, a special domain of extra protection. We should remember that this special 
domain comes at a cost. “Free” speech isn’t truly free.53 When we grant “speech” coverage, we require those who 
are harmed or treated unjustly by that speech to absorb more of its costs. Once any entity that conveys a wide range 
of information is suddenly analogous to a newspaper, we have begun making what was supposed to be exceptional 
treatment the new rule. While some might welcome this libertarian, deregulatory move in the short run, it is not only 
anathema to liberal theory but also, I suspect, unlikely to yield attractive outcomes in the long run. 
48 See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words 4–11 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1975) (preliminarily developing the 
notion of “performatives” — utterances that are the performance of an action, such as promising).
49 See Paco Underhill, Why We Buy: The Science of Shopping 85–86 (2009).
50 See id. at 80.
51 See id. at 205, 209.
52 A further complication is that, as any law student can tell you, not even all of what we would colloquially call “speech” is necessarily 
covered under the First Amendment — for instance, lying under oath, yelling “fire” in a theater, or threatening or defrauding someone. 
53 Cf. Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech (1994). 
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Volokh and Falk next say that search results are analogous to editorial publications because both involve choices 
about “how to rank and organize content,”54 “what should be presented to users,”55 and “what constitutes useful 
information.”56 These similarities to publishers fare no better. As I said before, every store organizes and “ranks” 
content through its layout.57 Are all store layouts now akin to editorial publications under the First Amendment? Are 
all stores First Amendment publishers? Again, I think the answer is no. But as an ex-Google product philosopher 
(and who doesn’t want that title?) points out, companies like Facebook, Google, and Twitter seek to influence users 
by means of various organizational and content choices in much the same way that grocery stores do by their layout 
and product placement.58 
One might respond here by saying that ranking and organizing only counts as analogous to editorial functions if 
what is ranked and organized is itself speech. But this is implausible. Surely Volokh and Falk think that a restaurant 
ranking qualifies as speech even though the underlying things ranked and organized — restaurants — are not. 
Thus, that the thing being ranked and organized is itself speech is not necessary for coverage. Is it sufficient?
Here is an argument for that position: A bookstore selects which books to sell. Wouldn’t we say that its selection of 
those books is itself speech? And if so, doesn’t that show that curating other people’s speech is necessarily speech 
itself? Once again, I think the answer is no. First, I hesitate to grant the premise — that we would call a booksell-
er’s book selections an independent instance of protected speech. I say this because in cases where the state has 
banned the sale of protected speech, the Court has invoked either the First Amendment rights of speech creators 
or would-be speech buyers. When sellers challenge these bans, they point to the First Amendment rights of those 
other parties. Take Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, where the Court struck down a law banning the 
sale of violent video games.59 Although its opinion was admittedly not a paragon of clarity, the Court in Brown con-
sidered the First Amendment rights of game creators and children buyers. Nowhere did the Court consider whether 
the ban might violate the speech rights of video game sellers. Second, and more fundamentally, even if a booksell-
er’s choice of which books to sell counts as speech, that still does not show that (1) every time an entity curates 
third-party speech that curation is itself speech, nor does it show what might ultimately be more crucial — namely, 
that (2) like the newspaper in Tornillo, requiring a modification of that curation constitutes compelled speech. I have 
already gone over the reason for (1). To see (2), consider the military recruitment case Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca-
demic and Institutional Rights (FAIR). 
In FAIR, a federal statute required law schools to provide military recruiters the same access to students as that 
given to other recruiters or lose funding.61 A group of law schools argued that requiring them to include the military 
54 Volokh & Falk, supra note 42, at 11. 
55 Id. at 14. 
56 Id. at 27. 
57 See Underhill, supra note 49, at 77–88.
58 Tristan Harris, How Technology Is Hijacking Your Mind — from a Magician and Google Design Ethicist, Thrive Global (May 18, 2016), 
http://journal.thriveglobal.com/how-technology-hijacks-peoples-minds-from-a-magician-and-google-s-design-ethicist-56d62ef5edf3; 
see also Paul Lewis, ‘Our Minds Can Be Hijacked’: The Tech Insiders Who Fear a Smartphone Dystopia, Guardian (Oct. 6, 2017), http://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/05/smartphone-addiction-silicon-valley-dystopia. 
59 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
60 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
61 Id. at 51.
SEARCH ENGINES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND THE EDITORIAL ANALOGY   |  11 
in their fairs would send students the message that the schools endorsed the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, 
which they did not. As a result, the schools argued that the requirement constituted unconstitutional compelled 
speech.62 The Court disagreed, holding that requiring law schools to give military recruiters equal access and even 
sending out scheduling emails to students on behalf of the military recruiters did not compel the law schools to 
speak at all. As the Court saw it, “schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.”63 
Even more, the Court thought some of the schools’ compelled-speech claims “trivialize[d] the freedom protected” in 
its prior compelled-speech cases.64 Given the Court’s ruling in FAIR, and even granting that the curation of third-par-
ty speech is itself speech, it is not the case that requiring an entity to include speech it dislikes within its curation 
necessarily entails compelling that entity to speak.
A final move someone might suggest to rehabilitate the Volokh and Falk position entails looking at the restaurant 
ranking differently — it doesn’t rank and organize restaurants but instead information about those restaurants. And 
so, any entity that makes such rankings is in the business of ranking and organizing information and is relevantly 
analogous to a publisher making editorial selections.65 Two points here. First, I find it difficult to characterize a 
restaurant ranking as the organization of information about restaurants. It seems more natural to say that it is a 
ranking of restaurants that also generates information (which restaurants are best and which are worst). Second, 
as already noted, virtually any activity that involves the creation of information entails some curatorial decisions. 
Unless we are willing to say that every such activity warrants constitutional protection, we must concede that the 
fact that newspaper editors and search engines both engage in the curation of information is not sufficient for finding 
the latter analogous, for First Amendment purposes, to the former. 
 B.  Potentially Relevant Dissimilarities 
While often unnoticed, the extent to which we find analogical reasoning convincing is based not only on relevant 
similarities but also on the absence of relevant dissimilarities. And as many have already pointed out, there are 
significant and arguably relevant dissimilarities between the outputs of tech companies like Facebook, Google, and 
Twitter, on the one hand, and newspapers, on the other.
To make this point about the importance of dissimilarity more concrete, consider the development of oil and gas 
rights in the United States. Courts were faced with the question of whether land owners had property rights to oil 
and gas reservoirs that lay underneath their land. Reasoning by analogy, early American courts were “captured” 
by an analogy to the law of capture. If you capture a wild animal while you’re on your own property, it’s yours.66 
Therefore, analogously, so long as you take out the gas and oil while you’re on your own property, it’s also yours. 
But of course, while in the grip of this analogy, courts failed to see the relevant dissimilarities between hunting wild 
animals and extracting oil and gas that made the analogy, and thus the application of the law of capture to oil and 
gas, problematic. For starters, such a rule incentivized landowners to over-drill so as to extract as much oil and gas 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 64. 
64 Id. at 62.
65 I thank Eric Goldman for making this argument to me.
66 See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
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as possible before their neighbors could do the same. Eventually we figured out that sometimes the dissimilarities 
are more important than the similarities and changed the rule.67 
Returning to editorial publications and tech company outputs, some scholars have argued that the use of algorithms 
creates a relevant dissimilarity. As Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale have put it, we should distinguish between 
dialogical and functional expression and only give First Amendment coverage to the former.68 The rough idea is 
that dialogical expression is perceived by the audience as something with which it can agree or disagree, criticize 
or support, argue for or against. In contrast, functional expression, while not clearly defined, is expression that the 
audience does not perceive as speech to which it can respond in these ways. Bracha and Pasquale argue that 
algorithmically generated search outputs are functional because users do not perceive rankings as expression with 
which they can dialogically engage.
Volokh and Falk object to claims that algorithms and their outputs are not speech, pointing in part to the fact that 
algorithms are written by humans and result from engineers’ judgments.69 However, if we instead put them in con-
versation with Bracha and Pasquale, they might argue that audiences do perceive these outputs as judgments with 
which they can critically engage — just consider the public outcry over certain rankings and what does or does not 
trend. Even if we accept the dialogical/functional methodology,70 it seems that both sides are only partially right. Bra-
cha and Pasquale are wrong to suggest that algorithmically encoded curation is necessarily functional. As others 
have suggested, we can conjure up some cases of algorithmic operations that look dialogical.71 This undermines 
the claim that the algorithm is what makes Facebook’s and Google’s curation non-speech.
Yet all of this is consistent with the plausible view, contra Volokh and Falk, that in light of how these companies por-
tray themselves and their outputs to the public, outputs like search results, lists of what is trending, and newsfeed 
fodder are not understood by most members of the public as dialogical expression on the order of the content a 
newspaper publishes. While newspapers generally stand behind their content, Google,72 Facebook,73 and Twitter 74 
67 For further discussion, see Richard Posner, How Judges Think 186–87 (2008); Grant Lamond, Analogical Reasoning in the Common 
Law, 34 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 567, 582–84 (2014).
68 Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1149, 1197–1200 (2008).
69 See Volokh & Falk, supra note 42, at 11. While I will not rehash it here, we can contest Volokh and Falk’s argument that the presence 
of judgments in constructing algorithms provides a reason why those algorithms’ outputs are analogous to editorial speech. Judgments 
are ubiquitous; First Amendment coverage is not. 
70 And I am reluctant to do so. The method seems to distinguish communicative acts from acts that communicate information, and I worry 
that such a divide is as unstable and illusory as philosophers of language have shown the communication-conduct distinction to be. See 
Austin, supra note 48, at 4–11. Thanks to Rob Hopkins for raising this issue.
71 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining What “the Freedom of Speech” Encom-
passes, 60 Duke L.J. 1673, 1704–05 (2011) (exploring, but ultimately rejecting, the possibility that network-design choices that the 
network operator makes to optimize certain types of communications might be understood as substantive speech protected by the First 
Amendment). 
72 See, e.g., Tom Warren, Google’s Top Search Results Promote Offensive Content, Again, Verge (Nov. 22, 2017), http://www.theverge.
com/2017/11/22/16689534/google-search-results-offensive-material (describing Google’s decision to remove offensive webpages and 
images that ranked highly in their search results for certain terms).
73 See, e.g., Jordan Crook, Fake Times, TechCrunch (Mar. 19, 2017), http://techcrunch.com/2017/03/19/facebook-will-never-take-re-
sponsibility-for-fake-news (“As part of a nationwide tour, Zuck[erberg] expressed that Facebook doesn’t want fake news on the plat-
form.”).
74 See, e.g., Marty Swant, Twitter Is Cracking Down on Trolls and Offensive Tweets with These New Tools, Adweek (Feb. 7, 2017), http://
www.adweek.com/digital/twitter-is-cracking-down-on-trolls-and-offensive-tweets-with-these-new-tools (describing steps Twitter has tak-
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have all explicitly disavowed the substance of their results. Newspapers also (and unsurprisingly) hold themselves 
out as editors, whereas these tech companies do everything they can to run from that categorization. It strikes me 
that selling themselves to the public in this way does lessen users’ perception that their outputs are dialogical. I 
doubt many people enter a search query into Google and think, “I now know Google’s views on my query.” And part 
of the reason for this may well be that these companies expressly tell users not to think the results are their speech 
(even as they claim the opposite in litigation). Self-presentation as not-a-speaker has another important conse-
quence: Users may not perceive requirements that these companies alter their results as tantamount to compelling 
the companies to speak.75 
To see why the public might not perceive these algorithmic outputs as the speech of these companies, let’s turn to 
a few specific examples.
Google’s Position: Not a Speaker 
 
We can start with the controversy over Google’s autocomplete function. As most reading this will be aware, when 
you start typing a search query into Google’s search box, Google automatically makes suggestions for how the 
query should be completed. These suggestions, which are generated algorithmically, depend on several variables, 
including what you are typing, what you have previously searched for, what others have searched for, and what is 
currently trending. In 2016, users noticed that when they typed “are Jews” or “are women,” Google suggested “evil” 
to complete the query. Similarly, when users typed “are Muslims,” Google suggested “bad.”76 In 2011, when a certain 
Italian citizen’s name was typed into Google’s search box, autocomplete suggestions included the Italian words for 
“con man” and “fraud.” The individual then sued Google for defamation and won.77 
If we really think the outputs of Google’s algorithms are its speech, this defamation suit makes sense. But Google 
argued the opposite. In its statement after losing the suit in Italian court, Google said, “We believe that Google 
should not be held liable for terms that appear in autocomplete as these are predicted by computer algorithms 
based on searches from previous users, not by Google itself.”78 If you go to Google’s support pages today and look 
under “Search using autocomplete,” you will see the following: “Note: Search predictions aren’t the answer to your 
search. They’re also not statements by other people or Google about your search terms.”79 We should pause to 
reflect on this. Google is not simply saying that the views of those it ranks are not its speech. More than that, it ex-
en to identify and minimize content on the platform that is “potentially abusive and low-quality”).
75 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006) (“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law 
schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and nothing in the [statute] restricts what the law schools may say about the military’s pol-
icies. We have held that high school students can appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school 
permits because legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.”).
76 See Samuel Gibbs, Google Alters Search Autocomplete to Remove “Are Jews Evil” Suggestion, Guardian (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/05/google-alters-search-autocomplete-remove-are-jews-evil-suggestion. 
77 David Meyer, Google Loses Autocomplete Defamation Case in Italy, ZDNet (April 5, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/article/google-los-
es-autocomplete-defamation-case-in-italy. 
78 Id. 
79 Google, Search Using Autocomplete, Google Search Help, http://support.google.com/websearch/answer/106230?co=GENIE.Plat-
form%3DAndroid&hl=en (last visited Jan. 11, 2018).
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pressly disavows as its own speech the very rankings and algorithmic outputs it claims in litigation to be its editorial 
speech.80  
There are, in fact, numerous situations in which Google disavows as its speech the very rankings that commen-
tators like Volokh and Falk argue are both its speech and analogous to the speech of editorial publications. Stuart 
Benjamin describes a case in which Google’s top result for the term “Jew” was an anti-Semitic site called “Jew 
Watch.” When civil rights groups pressured Google to delist the site, Google instead posted a note stating that its 
results rely on “algorithms using thousands of factors to calculate a page’s relevance to a given query” and that they 
don’t reflect “the beliefs and preferences of those who work at Google.”81 Google thus presented itself as a conduit 
for the speech of others — not so different from how Google saw internet service providers (ISPs) as conduits, at 
least when I worked there.82 Now consider Tornillo, where the newspaper was so intimately tied to the content it 
published that a mere right of reply was thought to compel the newspaper to speak. The difference between Tornillo 
and Google’s situation is clear. Google’s point is that its search-related outputs aren’t its speech at all.
Google most recently and explicitly eschewed the editorial analogy in its testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism in October of last year. It is worth reproducing in full the relevant dialogue 
between Louisiana Senator John Kennedy and Richard Salgado, Google’s law enforcement and information secu-
rity director:
Kennedy: Are you a media — let me ask Google this, to be fair. Are you a media company, or a neutral 
technology platform?
Salgado: We’re the technology platform, primarily. 
Kennedy: That’s what I thought you’d say. You don’t think you’re one of the largest, the largest newspapers 
in 92 countries? 
Salgado: We’re not a newspaper. We’re a platform for sharing of information that can include news from 
sources such as newspapers.
Kennedy: Isn’t that what newspapers do?
Salgado: This is a platform from which news can be read from news sources.83 
If we are stuck making First Amendment coverage determinations by analogy, we might want to look beyond the 
analogy Google explicitly rejected in its congressional testimony. 
80 Thanks to Daniel Viehoff for encouraging me to emphasize this point. 
81 Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1445, 1470 (2013) (quoting An Explanation of Our Search Results, 
Google, http://www.google.com/explanation.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013)). 
82 Joe Pinsker, Where Were Netflix and Google in the Net-Neutrality Fight?, Atlantic (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/busi-
ness/archive/2017/12/netflix-google-net-neutrality/548768. As Evgeny Morozov has pointed out, Google has also relied on a mirror 
metaphor that paints Google as simply and neutrally reflecting back the state of the world, where it is not a speaker and its outputs are 
not its speech. See Evgeny Morozov, To Save Everything, Click Here 144–46 (2013).
83 Thanks to Evelyn Douek for most helpfully sharing her summary and transcript excerpts from those hearings. See Evelyn Douek, 
Summary of Congressional Tech Hearings 16 (2017), http://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/2018/DOUEK%20Summa-
ry%20of%20Congressional%20Tech%20Hearings.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2018).
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Facebook’s Position: Not a Speaker
The history of Facebook’s Trending News and the recent controversy surrounding how its architecture facilitates — 
indeed, encourages — the proliferation of inflammatory and weaponized misinformation and propaganda provide 
further examples of a company that deliberately disclaims its curatorial products as its speech and itself as editor. 
Facebook launched Trending News in January 2014. By this time, Twitter had established itself as the go-to social 
media site for breaking news and minute-by-minute coverage of live events. As a result, Twitter could “gobble up 
enormous amounts of engagement during TV premieres, award shows, sport matches, and world news events.”84 
Twitter also successfully commercialized its Trending Topics feature, selling lucrative advertising space in the form 
of “promoted trends.”85 Facebook’s Trending News was viewed as the company’s attempt to emulate and compete 
with Twitter in this commercial space.86  
By the summer of 2014, Facebook was already facing criticism for its lack of serious news, both in Trending News 
and its main news feeds. The civil unrest in Ferguson was considered the year’s “most important domestic news 
story,” and while Twitter was hailed for its second-by-second coverage of Ferguson, there was scant evidence of 
the conflict on Facebook, which instead seemed dominated by the ALS ice bucket challenge.87 Some observers 
conjectured that Facebook’s feed algorithms were to blame.88 At one point, a senior Facebook employee said that 
the company was “actually working on it,” but uncertainty about the nature of the problem and Facebook’s response 
remained.89 Should we understand the lack of Ferguson coverage in people’s feeds as the editorial decision of 
Facebook? Did Facebook see the lack of Ferguson coverage as its own speech? After all, according to Volokh and 
Falk, that absence was clearly the result of algorithmic construction choices, which in turn reflected the judgments 
of the company’s engineers. And Facebook was criticized for its algorithm’s design, which basically hid controversial 
content and showed users more universally agreeable content, because the latter is what “keeps people coming 
back.”90 But once again, and unsurprisingly, this is not how Facebook saw it. Facebook did not see the resulting 
84 Josh Constine, Facebook Launches Trending Topics on Web with Descriptions of Why Each Is Popular, TechCrunch (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/01/16/facebook-trending.
85 See How Much Does It Cost to Advertise on Twitter?, ThriveHive (Feb. 21, 2017), http://thrivehive.com/how-much-does-it-cost-to-
advertise-on-twitter.
86 Garett Sloane, Facebook Lends Trending Hand to Brands, Adweek (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.adweek.com/digital/facebook-lends-
trending-hand-brands-155060. Accordingly, Facebook contacted advertising agencies to explain how brands could feature in Trending 
Topics and to explain the incentives for advertising on Facebook’s platform more generally. See id. This raises an important question: 
How ought the commerciality of these sites and the profit-driven decisions of which content to put before users alter our First Amend-
ment analysis? Volokh and Falk recognized the potential relevance of the commercial divide and limited their analysis to Google’s 
organic results. See Volokh & Falk, supra note 42, at 5–6 (“We focus in this submission on Google search results for which no payment 
has been made to Google . . . .”). Given the economic motivations behind organic rankings, it is not obvious to me that they should be 
considered noncommercial. Then again, given how the current Supreme Court has chipped away at the commercial-noncommercial 
distinction, it is hard to say how much commerciality will even matter moving forward.
87 Charlie Warzel, How Ferguson Exposed Facebook’s Breaking News Problem, BuzzFeed (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.
com/charliewarzel/in-ferguson-facebook-cant-deliver-on-its-promise-to-deliver; see also Ravi Somaiya, Facebook Takes Steps Against 
“Click Bait” Articles, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/26/business/media/facebook-takes-steps-against-
click-bait-articles.html (describing updates to Facebook’s algorithm designed to increase the quality of articles that users see).
88 See Warzel, supra note 87. 
89 Id.
91 Gail Sullivan, How Facebook and Twitter Control What You See About Ferguson, Wash. Post (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/08/19/how-facebook-and-twitter-control-what-you-see-about-ferguson. Again we see the tight 
connection between these companies’ “organic” algorithmic decisions and commercial objectives. Cf. supra note 86.
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absence of Ferguson coverage as its own speech, let alone the product of a deliberate decision akin to the choices 
made by a newspaper to write about or neglect that same topic. Nor does Facebook’s recognition that it needed to 
respond to the controversy by tweaking its algorithm, which it did,91 necessarily suggest that the lack of Ferguson 
coverage in Facebook feeds was an editorial judgment.
As this episode underscored, Facebook straightforwardly does not see itself as an editor or its curation as its 
speech. Instead, in a Q&A session, Zuckerberg, much like Google, characterized Facebook as more analogous to 
a neutral conduit or tool that enables the speech of others: 
What we’re trying to do is make it so that every single person in the world has a voice and a channel and 
can share their opinions, or research, or facts that they’ve come across, and can broadcast that out to their 
friends and family and people who follow them and want to hear what they have to say.
. . . . We view it as our job to . . . giv[e] everyone the richest tools to communicate and share what’s import-
ant to them.92 
This innocent-conduit-for-the-speech-of-others framing is not inconsistent with the facts that, by 2014, Facebook 
was the primary driver of traffic to most of the top news websites93 and that, by 2017, 45 percent of U.S. adults were 
getting at least some of their news from Facebook.94 Facebook has become “to the news business what Amazon is 
to book publishing — a behemoth that provides access to hundreds of millions of consumers and wields enormous 
power.”95 Nevertheless, Greg Marra, the engineer who oversees Facebook’s News Feed algorithm, said in an in-
terview that he and his team “explicitly view ourselves as not editors. . . . We don’t want to have editorial judgment 
over the content,” because users are in the best position to decide what they want to see.96 
Facebook’s response to the 2016 controversy surrounding the curation of Trending Topics further drives home the 
editorial disanalogy. Back in 2014, Facebook said that its Trending Topics articles were ranked by an algorithm 
91 Martin Beck, Timely Change? Facebook Adjusts News Feed Algorithm to Surface More Trending Stories, Marketing Land (Sept. 
18, 2014), http://marketingland.com/facebook-adjusts-news-feed-algorithm-surface-timely-stories-100630. By August, Facebook had 
already announced tweaks to its algorithm meant to reduce clickbait articles, by considering how long users spent reading an article 
and whether they shared it (though, as we eventually learned, these metrics did not weed out fake news). See Somaiya, supra note 87. 
92 David Cohen, Mark Zuckerberg Q&A: Dislike Button, Ferguson, Graph Search, News Feed Study Controversy, Adweek (Dec. 12, 
2014), http://www.adweek.com/digital/mark-zuckerberg-qa-121114.
93 Amy Mitchell et al., Pew Research Ctr., Social, Search & Direct: Pathways to Digital News 23–24 (2014), http://assets.pewresearch.
org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2014/03/SocialSearchandDirect_PathwaystoDigitalNews.pdf.
94 Elisa Shearer & Jeffrey Gottfried, Pew Research Ctr., News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017 (2017), http://www.journalism.
org/2017/09/07/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2017.
95 Somaiya, supra note 87.
96 Id. A common reply is that conduits can be “neutral” but platforms and their algorithms cannot. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Search Engine 
Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 Yale J.L. & Tech. 188 (2006) (making an argument along these lines). I take this 
to be a false dichotomy. There aren’t neutral conduits on one side and non-neutral platforms on the other. Something being “neutral” just 
means neutral against some baseline. But the threshold choice of that baseline is itself a non-neutral judgment. Many say, for example, 
that ISPs should be “neutral” with respect to content; this is a cornerstone of the net neutrality movement. But what is “neutral” here? 
Making all content creators pay the same amount? Treating similar kinds of content similarly? Our definition of “neutral” does not emerge 
from the sea fully grown—we decide it.
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based on metrics like popularity and timeliness.97 Until the publication of a story by Recode in August 2015, there 
appears to have been no awareness that this was not the whole truth.98 That story suggested that Facebook’s work-
ers had some hand in shaping Trending Topics content — not by selecting which articles appeared (“that’s done 
automatically by the algorithm”) but by writing headlines.99 But in two explosive pieces on the tech news site Giz-
modo in May 2016, Michael Nunez reported that the involvement of workers went much further: Material appearing 
in Trending News was curated by Facebook contractors who, in addition to writing headlines, selected which topics 
trended and which sites they linked to.100 These contractors reported that they were told to link to stories from pre-
ferred outlets like the New York Times; that they had a prerogative, which they regularly exercised, to blacklist topics 
that weren’t covered by multiple traditional news sources or that concerned Facebook itself; and that they were 
told not to publicize that they were working for Facebook, presumably because the company “wanted to keep the 
magic about how trending topics work a secret.”101 Contractors subsequently reported that they had also injected 
stories about topics like Black Lives Matter into Trending News at the behest of management, who thought certain 
topics should be trending regardless of algorithmic metrics.102 Most controversially, the contractors reported that 
pro-conservative stories were regularly excluded from Trending News, not at management’s instruction, but on ac-
count of left-leaning colleagues using their prerogative to blacklist topics.103 Based on these reports, Nunez argued 
that Facebook wanted to “foster the illusion of a bias-free news ranking process” and that Facebook was obscuring 
its workers’ involvement because it “risk[ed] losing its image as a non-partisan player in the media industry” rather 
than “an inherently flawed curator.”104 In Nunez’s view, Facebook worked like a newsroom, expressing the views of 
its staff in its reporting, in “stark contrast” to the company’s depiction of Trending News as merely “topics that have 
recently become popular on Facebook”105 or “a neutral pipeline for distributing content.”106 
This did not sit well with Republicans. Within hours of Nunez’s second report, Republican National Committee 
Chairman Reince Priebus demanded that Facebook “answer for conservative censorship.”107 A post on the GOP’s 
official blog argued (presciently) that “Facebook has the power to greatly influence the presidential election” and ob-
jected to its platform “being used to silence viewpoints and stories that don’t fit someone else’s agenda.”108 Shortly 
thereafter, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John Thune — a leading critic of the Federal Communications 
97 Updates to Trending, Facebook Newsroom (Dec. 10, 2014), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2014/12/updates-to-trending.
98 Kurt Wagner, How Facebook Decides What’s Trending, Recode (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.recode.net/2015/8/21/11617880/how-
facebook-decides-whats-trending. 
99 Id.
100 Michael Nunez, Want to Know What Facebook Really Thinks of Journalists? Here’s What Happened When It Hired Some, Gizmodo 
(May 3, 2016), http://gizmodo.com/want-to-know-what-facebook-really-thinks-of-journalists-1773916117.
101 Nunez, supra note 100. 
102 Michael Nunez, Former Facebook Workers: We Routinely Suppressed Conservative News, Gizmodo (May 9, 2016), http://gizmodo.
com/former-facebook-workers-we-routinely-suppressed-conser-1775461006.
103 Id. Nunez reported that the contractors, in addition to having a liberal political bent, had all previously worked in the news industry 
and mostly came from Ivy League and elite East Coast colleges. See Nunez, supra note 100. 
104 Nunez, supra note 100.
105 Nunez, supra note 102.
106 Nunez, supra note 100.
107 Tony Romm & Hadas Gold, Inside Facebook’s GOP Charm Offensive, Politico (May 16, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/05/
facebook-conservatives-zuckerberg-bias-223244. 
108 Team GOP, #MakeThisTrend: Facebook Must Answer for Conservative Censorship, GOP.com: Blog (May 9, 2016), http://gop.com/
makethistrend-facebook-must-answer-for-liberal-bias.
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Commission’s fairness doctrine until it was officially repealed (after years of non-enforcement) in 2011109 — notified 
Facebook that his committee was exploring a consumer protection investigation. In his words:
If Facebook presents its Trending Topics section as the result of a neutral, objective algorithm, but it is in 
fact subjective and filtered to support or suppress particular political viewpoints, Facebook’s assertion that 
it maintains a platform for people and perspectives from across the political spectrum misleads the public.110
Thune gave Facebook fourteen days to provide details of its guidelines for preventing the suppression of political 
views, the training it provided workers in relation to those guidelines, and its methods for monitoring compliance.111 
Despite the view of lawyers who thought that Facebook could (and perhaps should) invoke the editorial analogy and 
reject Thune’s demands on First Amendment grounds,112 the company responded to Thune,113 explained its practic-
es, and shared its internal Trending Topics review guidelines.114 Facebook’s senior leaders also met with a number 
of top Republican leaders to reassure them that it was an impartial platform.115 In its letter to Senator Thune, Face-
book said that it found “no evidence of systematic political bias” but couldn’t rule out occasional biased judgment by 
its curators.116 It also identified, and pledged to reform, two parts of its process for generating Trending News. First, 
it would end its practice of boosting topics being covered by preferred major media players like BBC News, CNN, 
Fox News, and the New York Times (a change, looking back, that we might wish Facebook had not made). Second, 
the company stated that it would “take prompt remedial actions” should it find evidence of “improper actions taken 
on the basis of political bias.”117 
Facebook’s response to this issue, in the following months and amid a contentious U.S. election cycle, was to re-
place the Trending News curatorial team with engineers who had a more mechanical role in approving stories gen-
erated by the Trending News algorithm. These engineers, as one writer poetically put it, would be “the algorithm’s 
janitors.”118 Per its revised guidelines, Facebook removed its own headlines and summaries, and all featured news 
109 Robinson Meyer, Facebook Doesn’t Have to Be Fair, Atlantic (May 13, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/05/
facebook-isnt-fair/482610. 
110 Thune Letter, supra note 2, at 1–2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 Id. at 2–3.
112 See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti & Mike Isaac, Senator Demands Answers from Facebook on Claims of ‘Trending’ List Bias, N.Y. Times 
(May 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/11/technology/facebook-thune-conservative.html; Thomas C. Rubin, Facebook’s 
Trending Topics Are None of the Senate’s Business, Slate (May 23, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurispru-
dence/2016/05/facebook_s_trending_topics_are_none_of_the_senate_s_business.html.
113 Colin Stretch, Response to Chairman John Thune’s Letter on Trending Topics, Facebook Newsroom (May 23, 2016), http://news-
room.fb.com/news/2016/05/response-to-chairman-john-thunes-letter-on-trending-topics.
114 Justin Osofsky, Information About Trending Topics, Facebook Newsroom (May 12, 2016), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/05/
information-about-trending-topics. A link to the guidelines can be found in this article.
115 Romm & Gold, supra note 107.
116 Letter from Colin Stretch, Facebook Gen. Counsel, to Sen. Thune 1–2 (May 23, 2016), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_
cache/files/93a14e98-2443-4d27-bf04-1fc59b8cf2b4/22796A1389F52BE16D225F9A03FB53F8.facebook-letter.pdf. 
117 Id. at 11.
118 Abby Ohlheiser, Three Days After Removing Human Editors, Facebook Is Already Trending Fake News, Wash. Post (Aug. 29, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/29/a-fake-headline-about-megyn-kelly-was-trending-on-facebook. For 
further explanation of these changes, see Search FYI: An Update on Trending, Facebook Newsroom (Aug. 26, 2016), http://newsroom.
fb.com/news/2016/08/search-fyi-an-update-to-trending; Sam Thielman, Facebook Fires Trending Team, and Algorithm Without Humans 
Goes Crazy, Guardian (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/29/facebook-fires-trending-topics-team-algo-
rithm. 
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stories, including their accompanying excerpt, became algorithmically generated, based on “spikes in conversa-
tion.”119 The only non-algorithmic effect on content was when reviewers found clear mistakes—such as duplicate 
topics,120 posts about non-news,121 and posts about fictional events — and when they separated topics that had 
been automatically clustered under a single heading by the algorithm.122 Before approving a topic, reviewers also 
confirmed that each topic contained at least three recently posted articles or five recently published posts, reviewed 
the keywords associated with the topic, nominated related topics, and set the topic location and category (for ex-
ample, business, sports, or politics). From this point on, the source of posted articles no longer had a bearing on 
whether a topic would appear in Trending News.
Facebook thus changed its practices to become more “neutral,” however amorphous the concept. The company 
wanted to make clear that its rankings were not its speech. Recall that in the FAIR case, the Court thought that 
requiring law schools to include military recruiters was not compelled speech, as even “high school students can 
appreciate the difference between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because legally re-
quired to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.”123 Facebook is asking users to do this very same thing — to 
appreciate that what is trending is not Facebook’s speech, even though it is on its platform.
Unfortunately, the more Facebook went out of its way to not be an editor, the more its Trending News algorithm was, 
as various news outlets characterized it, a “disaster,”124 an algorithm “go[ne] crazy.”125 A few days after the change, 
Megyn Kelly was trending with a false headline: “Fox News Exposes Traitor Megyn Kelly, Kicks Her Out for Backing 
Hillary.”126 At the same time, four Washington Post journalists ran an experiment on their personal Facebook ac-
counts to look at the sorts of stories in Trending News and uncovered that, from August 31 to September 22, there 
were “five trending stories that were indisputably fake and three that were profoundly inaccurate.”127 Throughout 
all of this, Zuckerberg did not reconsider his prior insistence that Facebook is “a tech company, not a media com-
pany.”128 For better or worse, it is hard to imagine Facebook trying harder to distance itself from both the editorial 
analogy and any claim that what showed up in Trending News was its speech. Even in the wake of Trump’s win, 
when “everyone from President Obama to the Pope . . . raised concerns about fake news and the potential impact 
119 Trending Review Guidelines, Facebook Newsroom (Aug. 26, 2016), http://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2016/08/trending-re-
view-guidelines.pdf.
120 For example, if “NBA Finals” is a live Trending Topic, the team would not accept “#NBAFinals” as a new topic. See id.
121 For example, while “#lunch” peaks in usage across the site during lunchtime every day and around the world, curators would not allow 
#lunch to be a trending topic because it is not tied to a news event. See id.
122 For instance, when Congressman John Lewis said that he didn’t believe Trump was a legitimate president and Trump tweeted against 
Lewis in response, the Trending Topics algorithm might pick up a spike in references to Trump and Lewis together, and the two might be 
clustered together as if they were all part of one conversation. The reviewer’s job would be to ensure that the algorithmically suggested 
clustering is correct. See id.
123 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006).
124 Will Oremus, Trending Bad: How Facebook’s Foray into Automated News Went from Messy to Disastrous, Slate (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/08/how_facebook_s_trending_news_feature_went_from_messy_to_disas-
trous.html. 
125 Thielman, supra note 118.
126 See Ohlheiser, supra note 118.
127 Caitlin Dewey, Facebook Has Repeatedly Trended Fake News Since Firing Its Human Editors, Wash. Post (Oct. 12, 2016), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/10/12/facebook-has-repeatedly-trended-fake-news-since-firing-its-human-edi-
tors. 
128 Giulia Segreti, Facebook CEO Says Group Will Not Become a Media Company, Reuters (Aug. 29, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-facebook-zuckerberg/facebook-ceo-says-group-will-not-become-a-media-company-idUSKCN1141WN.
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on both political life and innocent individuals,”129 Zuckerberg reiterated that he and his company “do not want to be 
arbiters of truth ourselves, but instead [want to] rely on our community and trusted third parties.”130 
When we diagnose what went wrong with regard to fake news, we need not conclude that Facebook made the 
mistake of trying to be too neutral. Instead, we can realize that our (and their) previous conception of what “neu-
trality” entailed — not privileging certain news sources and treating all sources of “news” the same — was wrong. 
Facebook, and the rest of us, learned that treating fake news sites on a par with the Wall Street Journal and the 
New York Times is saying something very not “neutral” about how we should treat information from those sites. Just 
recently, Facebook announced that it will once again rank news sources, but this time it plans to do so based on 
user evaluations of those sources.131 We can debate this method as well, but it represents yet another attempt by 
Facebook to figure out what “neutral” means and then do it. 
Finally, like Google, Facebook and Twitter were asked during recent congressional hearings how they “respond to . 
. . the growing concerns that [they] and other Silicon Valley companies are putting a thumb on the scale of political 
debate and shifting it in ways consistent with the political views of [their] employees?”132 Facebook General Coun-
sel Colin Stretch replied, “Senator, again, we think of ourselves as a platform of all ideas — for all ideas and we 
aspire to that.”133 Stretch then discussed training given to prevent bias in its employees, saying, “We want to make 
sure that people’s own biases are not brought to bear in how we manage the platform.”134 Responding to the same 
question, Sean Edgett of Twitter insisted that “our goal and . . . one of our fundamental principles at the company 
is to remain impartial.”135 
Whatever the analogical similarities these companies share with publishers, these companies see the analogical 
dissimilarities as more salient. Given this, it is hard to see why we should extend First Amendment coverage to the 
choices they make about how to run their platforms. And perhaps more significantly, these companies’ self-con-
ception dramatically weakens the claim that requirements to change their outputs would unconstitutionally compel 
them to speak.
III. Competing Analogies
In addition to delving into some internal weaknesses of the editorial analogy, we can cast further doubt on its 
near-automatic acceptance by raising rival analogical frameworks that either (1) suggest that these companies’ 
judgments should not receive free speech coverage or (2) assume some coverage but suggest ways that gov-
ernment regulation would not count as compelling these companies to speak. The ISP-like conduit analogy has 
129 Michael Barthel et al., Many Americans Believe Fake News Is Sowing Confusion, Pew Research Ctr. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.
journalism.org/2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion.
130 Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10103269806149061.
131 See Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook to Rank News Sources by Quality to Battle Misinformation, Wall St. J. (Jan. 19, 2018), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-to-rank-news-sources-by-quality-to-battle-misinformation-1516394184. 
132 Douek, supra note 83, at 18.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 19.
135 Id. 
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already been discussed extensively by others (and briefly by me above),136 so here I will mention three other sets: 
shopping malls or law schools, fiduciaries or public trustees, and public forums or public squares. My goal here is 
not to convince you of one analogy above the rest but instead to show the limitations and (often unstated) normative 
judgments inherent in making First Amendment coverage determinations via analogy at all. 
 A. Shopping Mall or Law School
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,137 the appellees, a group of high school students, set up a stand to gather 
signatures for a petition in a privately owned shopping center. Security guards forced the students to leave; the 
students sued, claiming a right to solicit signatures on the premises under the California Constitution. The California 
Supreme Court ruled in their favor, but the PruneYard Shopping Center appealed, claiming a violation of its speech 
rights under the Federal Constitution. Most interestingly for our purposes, in its briefs PruneYard cited Tornillo to 
argue analogically. That is, PruneYard argued that requiring it to allow the students to petition was analogous to 
compelling newspapers to publish replies by political candidates they criticize.138 Now, we can see that there are 
some similarities between a shopping center and a newspaper — for example, both decide what to present to con-
sumers, and both convey information to those consumers by means of their curatorial decisions (i.e., they share 
the same similarities Volokh and Falk identified between newspapers and Google). But crucially, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not think those similarities were salient. Instead, the Court took a different, and better, methodological 
approach. It looked at the reasoning underlying Tornillo to see whether that same reasoning was applicable to a 
shopping mall.139 As the PruneYard Court saw it, the state cannot force newspapers to publish right-of-reply articles 
because doing so would deter editors “from publishing controversial political statements” and thus limit the “vigor” 
and “variety” of public debate.140 But such concerns did not apply in the case of a shopping center, and so the anal-
ogy did not hold sway. The Court ruled that PruneYard’s First Amendment rights were not infringed by the students’ 
state-given rights of expression and petition on its property. Indeed, the Court did not think allowing the students to 
petition compelled PruneYard to speak at all.141 
The Court again discussed and rejected the Tornillo analogy in FAIR.142 While the law schools argued that requir-
ing them to treat military and non-military recruiters alike unconstitutionally compels them to speak — to send a 
message about their views on a military policy with which they disagreed — the Court thought otherwise. Unlike a 
newspaper engaging in First Amendment-protected activity in choosing which editorials to run, the Court held that 
“schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.”143
136 The New York Times recently used similar language when describing these tech platforms. See Farhad Manjoo, How 2017 Became 
a Turning Point for Tech Giants, N.Y. Times: State of the Art (Dec. 13, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/technology/tech-com-
panies-social-responsibility.html (“Think of these platforms as the roads, railroads and waterways of the information economy—an 
essentially inescapable part of life for any business or regular person who doesn’t live in a secluded cabin in the woods.”).
137 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
138 See Brief of Appellants, PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (No. 79-289), 1979 WL 199940, at *13. 
139 This same move was made by the ACLU in its amicus brief. See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California et 
al. as Amici Curiae, PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (No. 79-289), 1980 WL 339574, at *39–*41.
140 447 U.S. at 88.
141 See id.
142 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). 
143 Id. at 64. 
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We can analogize both the PruneYard Shopping Center and the law schools to Facebook Trending and Google 
Search in a way that has prima facie appeal. Like PruneYard and the schools, neither Facebook nor Google is 
literally a newspaper. Both companies’ platforms, like the shopping center, are generally accessible to all. Like the 
shopping center’s selecting which retailers to lease space to and the law schools’ selecting which employers to 
participate in their recruitment fairs, Facebook and Google make curatorial decisions. As I have discussed at length 
above, Facebook and Google can and do publicly dissociate themselves from the views expressed by people who 
speak through their platforms and from the products of their own curatorial efforts (such as a particular ranking). 
The Supreme Court thought it important that PruneYard and the law schools were capable of doing the same. Thus, 
if we reason by this analogy, Facebook and Google are also not compelled to speak when required to let others 
speak on their platform. 
Analogous to PruneYard, it is also not obvious that regulations preventing Facebook, Google, and Twitter from mak-
ing certain curatorial and architectural choices — for example, from delisting competitors’ sites or refusing their ads, 
deactivating user live streams at the behest of police with no judicial oversight,144 striking deals with record labels to 
preemptively block the upload of certain user videos,145 or relying on monetization models that encourage addictive 
behaviors146 and the development of polarized epistemic bubbles that in turn facilitate the viral spread of fake news 
and propaganda147 — would limit the vigor or variety of public debate. Indeed, it’s important to remember that even 
if, like in PruneYard, the state can force these private actors to permit third-party speech in ways that do not require 
the companies themselves to speak, the First Amendment rights of users remain. The government could not have 
silenced the high school petitioners in PruneYard, and the same can be said for political dissent on Facebook.
In short, we can plausibly analogize Facebook, Google, and Twitter to the shopping center in PruneYard or the law 
schools in FAIR, instead of to the newspaper in Tornillo. And when we do, certain regulations don’t look constitu-
tionally problematic after all.
144 As was the case when Korryn Gaines, a black woman, was shot and killed, and her five-year-old son shot twice, during a stand-
off at her home with police officers. See Hanna Kozlowska, Facebook Is Giving the US Government More and More Data, Quartz 
(Dec. 19, 2017), http://qz.com/1160719/facebooks-transparency-report-the-company-is-giving-the-us-government-more-and-more-da-
ta; Baynard Woods, Facebook Deactivated Korryn Gaines’ Account During Standoff, Police Say, Guardian (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/03/korryn-gaines-facebook-account-baltimore-police; see also Mike Isaac & Sydney Ember, Live 
Footage of Shootings Forces Facebook to Confront New Role, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/technol-
ogy/facebook-dallas-live-video-breaking-news.html (discussing the Facebook live stream of the killing of Philando Castile by police and 
how “it was taken down by Facebook for a few hours without explanation. Facebook blamed a technical glitch for the video’s removal, 
but declined to speak further of the incident”).
145 See Videos Removed or Blocked Due to YouTube’s Contractual Obligations, YouTube Help, http://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/3045545?hl=en (last visited Feb. 2, 2018); Mike Masnick, YouTube Won’t Put Your Video Back Up, Even If It’s Fair Use, If It 
Contains Music from Universal Music, TechDirt (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130405/01191322589/youtube-wont-
put-your-video-back-up-even-if-its-fair-use-if-it-contains-content-universal-music.shtml. 
146 See generally Adam Alter, Irresistible: The Rise of Addictive Technology and the Business of Keeping Us Hooked (2017); Julian 
Morgans, Your Addiction to Social Media Is No Accident, Vice (May 19, 2017), http://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vv5jkb/the-secret-
ways-social-media-is-built-for-addiction. 
147 See Renee Diresta & Tristan Harris, Why Facebook and Twitter Can’t Be Trusted to Police Themselves, Politico Mag. (Nov. 1, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/01/why-facebook-and-twitter-cant-be-trusted-to-police-themselves-215775; Kurt Wag-
ner, Facebook Is Making a Major Change to the News Feed that Will Show You More Content from Friends and Family and Less from 
Publishers, Recode (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.recode.net/2018/1/11/16881160/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-news-feed-algorithm-con-
tent-video-friends-family-media-publishers. 
  Many have suggested something along these lines. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1183 (2016); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 868 (2014). 
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 B.  Fiduciary or Public Trustee 
An alternative analogical approach conceives of major tech companies as information fiduciaries.148 Tim Wu raises 
a similar idea when he asks whether new laws and regulations should “requir[e] that major speech platforms be-
have as public trustees, with general duties to police fake users, remove propaganda robots, and promote a robust 
speech environment surrounding matters of public concern.”149 As Wu points out, such a move would require a 
reorientation of the First Amendment so as to renew the concern the Court evinced for the speech rights of listeners 
(or users) in cases like Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.150 
While this analogy may seem unlikely to be adopted in practice, such a move accords with the Court’s recognition in 
Packingham of cyberspace as “the most important place” for the exchange of views.151 In the recent congressional 
hearings with social media companies, it was also clear that all the participants were operating on a background 
assumption that while dealing with problems like those generated by Russian interference in the election, these 
companies had to be mindful of First Amendment principles. At one point, Senator Dick Durbin remarked, “Now take 
the word Russian out of it. A Facebook account that promotes anti-immigrant, anti-refugee sentiment in the United 
States. I don’t know if you would characterize that as vile. I sure would.”152 Pursuing this concern, Senator Durbin 
asked, “How are you going to sort this out, consistent with the basic values of this country when it comes to freedom 
of expression?”153 
If we thought of these companies as the same as any other private company, the idea that their solutions need to be 
consistent with the First Amendment would seem confused. Under existing doctrine, the tech companies don’t need 
to comply with the First Amendment, nor concern themselves with the First Amendment rights of users, because 
they aren’t engaged in state action. But even putting aside a finding of state action, members of the government, 
ordinary citizens, and the companies themselves do seem to see the companies as having a fiduciary-type role, 
given the importance of their platforms as spaces of public debate.154  
Further movement toward a public trustee role was also essentially called for by a shareholder proposal filed with 
Facebook and Twitter by Arjuna Capital (an activist investment firm) and the New York State Common Retirement 
Fund (the nation’s third-largest public pension fund).155 And Zuckerberg embraced a public trustee model in his 2018 
annual self-challenge156 and Yom Kippur atonement.157 Zuckerberg did not commit to turning Facebook into a better 
149 Tim Wu, Knight First Amendment Inst., Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 23 (2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/sites/default/files/
content/Emerging%20Threats%20Tim%20Wu%20Is%20the%20First%20Amendment%20Obsolete.pdf.
150 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
151 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
152 Douek, supra note 83, at 14. 
153 Id.
154 See also Franklin Foer, Facebook Finally Blinks, Atlantic (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/
facebook/550376 (“The company finally acted as if it might assume the responsibilities implied by its power . . . .”). 
155 See Nitaska Tiku, Investors Join Calls for Facebook, Twitter to Take More Responsibility, Wired (Jan. 11, 2018), http://www.wired.
com/story/investors-join-calls-for-facebook-twitter-to-take-more-responsibility.
156 Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104380170714571 (“The world feels anxious 
and divided, and Facebook has a lot of work to do—whether it’s protecting our community from abuse and hate, defending against 
interference by nation states, or making sure that time spent on Facebook is time well spent.”).
157 See Ian Sherr, Zuckerberg Says He’s Committed to Fixing Facebook This Year, CNET (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.cnet.com/news/
zuckerberg-says-hes-committed-to-fixing-facebook-hate-harassment-russia (describing Zuckerberg’s apology “for the ways my work 
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newspaper editor; he suggested that the company would “assume the responsibilities implied by [its] power,” much 
like a public trustee would.158 And while these latter two are Zuckerberg’s personal commitments, as Facebook’s 
CEO and a controlling shareholder, he has fiduciary duties of his own to think about. 
Like the editorial analogy, analogizing these companies to fiduciaries or public trustees is prima facie plausible. 
Indeed, even more so than in the case of the editorial analogy, pretty much all of the relevant parties act (at least 
outside of litigation) as if something like this were the case today. If these companies were analogized to fiduciaries 
for purposes of First Amendment law, then as with lawyers and doctors, case law supports the regulation of their 
fiduciary-related choices, even assuming those choices are speech.
 C. Company Town or Public Forum 
When considering the company town or limited public forum analogy, we should distinguish two distinct positions: 
(1) the social media sites themselves are like company towns or create limited public forums such that when the 
company bans or delists someone, there are First Amendment implications; and (2) government officials who com-
municate to the public through their pages on these privately owned platforms can violate users’ First Amendment 
rights by banning the users or deleting their comments.
Up until recently, courts have rejected the first and been uncertain about the second.159 As all lawyers know, for the 
First Amendment to apply, there must be state action. And rarely does a private actor’s power rise to that level. But 
historical moments — and the nature of emerging threats — matter. As Eric Goldman observes, “We can’t ignore 
that there is such skepticism towards internet companies’ consolidation of power.”160 Goldman was focused on an-
titrust, but the point generalizes. If we combine this skepticism with the Court’s broad language in Packingham, the 
once off-the-wall theory that these companies should count as state actors for First Amendment purposes is starting 
to look a bit more on the table. And indeed, both the language of Packingham and its public square analogy have 
made appearances in recent suits by users alleging that social media companies violated their First Amendment 
rights.161 More than that, they have already appeared in court opinions concerning the same.162 It seems possible 
was used to divide people rather than bring us together”).
158 Foer, supra note 154.
159 See, e.g., Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). First Amendment arguments leveled against online platforms 
go back at least to Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996). As for the latter position, while 
courts have found several government-run websites not to be open public forums, those same courts have also suggested that the 
outcomes would be different if the sites were more dynamic and open to the public. See, e.g., Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 
334–35 (1st Cir. 2009); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275, 284 (4th Cir. 2008); Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 
Tennessee, 221 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2000). Prior to Packingham, the district court in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervi-
sors, 1:16-cv-932 (JCC/IDD), 2017 WL 1929406 (E.D. Va. May 10, 2017), a case involving comments on a county chair’s Facebook 
page, found that the question could not be answered at summary judgment. 
160 Joseph Bernstein & Charlie Warzel, Far-Right Activist Charles Johnson Has Sued Twitter over His Suspension, BuzzFeed (Jan. 8, 
2018,), http://www.buzzfeed.com/josephbernstein/far-right-activist-charles-johnson-has-sued-twitter-over.
161 See, e.g., id. (complaint embedded in article); Caitlin Dewey, Charles Johnson, One of the Internet’s Most Infamous Trolls, Has Finally 
Been Banned from Twitter, Wash. Post (May 26, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/05/26/charles-
johnson-one-of-the-internets-most-infamous-trolls-has-finally-been-banned-from-twitter; Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg, Google, 
Twitter Face New Lawsuits Alleging Discrimination Against Conservative Voices, Wash. Post (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.washington-
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/01/08/google-faces-a-lawsuit-over-discriminating-against-white-men-and-conservatives; Ian Lovett 
& Jack Nicas, PragerU Sues YouTube in Free-Speech Case, Wall St. J. (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/prageru-sues-
youtube-in-free-speech-case-1508811856; Heather Whitney, Does the Packingham Ruling Presage Greater Government Control over 
Search Results? Or Less?, Tech. & Marketing L. Blog (June 22, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/06/does-the-packing-
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that the Court has signaled a willingness to return to an earlier and more capacious reading of the state action 
doctrine.
The second question concerns whether government officials’ pages on private social platforms can amount to lim-
ited public forums under the First Amendment. And while certain cases suggesting an affirmative answer predate 
Packingham,163 Packingham has already been used to bolster that conclusion. Most obviously, the Knight First 
Amendment Institute itself has argued, citing Packingham, that Trump’s @realDonaldTrump Twitter account is a 
designated public forum and that his banishment of seven Twitter users violates their First Amendment rights.164 
As for the company town or limited public forum analogy, there are two strands of state action doctrine worth men-
tioning here. The first concerns public function and the second entanglement. And we can make out analogies to 
cases in both.
The classic public function case is Marsh v. Alabama, which involved a company town. As happened not infrequent-
ly in the early 1900s, companies would build “towns” and then have their workers live and buy within them. Often, 
companies would use a claim of private property to prohibit certain individuals, particularly union organizers, from 
entering the town, bringing out the police in the event of any trespass.166 In Marsh, it was not a union organizer but 
a Jehovah’s Witness who was arrested for trespass while distributing religious literature on the company-owned 
sidewalk. The Court held that the company’s actions constituted state action, because the entire company town had 
“all the characteristics of any other American town,” save for the fact that it was privately owned.167 The company 
executed a public function, and that meant it could be treated as a state actor for constitutional purposes. 
So when it comes to Facebook, Google, and Twitter, what counts as a “public function”? As the history of the state 
ham-ruling-presage-greater-government-control-over-search-results-or-less-guest-blog-post.htm. Litigants have also used Packingham 
to bolster arguments that private commercial websites, and not only physical structures, can be “public accommodations” for purposes 
of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., Andrews v. Blick Art Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); 
Del-Orden v. Bonobos, Inc., No. 17 CIV. 2744 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017), 2017 WL 6547902, at *10. 
162 See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., No. 17-CV-03301-EMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 3473663, at *7 (“The Court’s 
analogy of the Internet in general, and social networking sites in particular, to the ‘modern public square,’ embraces the social norm that 
assumes the openness and accessibility of that forum to all comers.” (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 
(2017))); see also Venkat Balasubramani, LinkedIn Enjoined from Blocking Scraper—hiQ v. LinkedIn, Techn. & Marketing L. Blog (Aug. 
15, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/08/linkedin-enjoined-from-blocking-scraper-hiq-v-linkedin.htm (response from Eric 
Goldman noting that “[c]ollectively, it looks like some courts are reading Packingham to enshrine a general purpose right of users to get 
content without restriction on the Internet—which would be an interesting and potentially far-reaching implication of the ruling”).
163 See, e.g., Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 776 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-1771 (June 27, 2017) (“The Court has 
already ruled that the Loudoun County Social Media Comments Policy—both as originally written and as amended—serves to create 
a limited public forum as applied to the Loudoun County Commonwealth’s Attorney Facebook page.”); see also supra note 159 (citing 
additional cases).
164 Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 16, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05205 
(S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017); see also Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 703, 715–19 (E.D. Va. 2017) (citing 
Packingham and holding, without deciding on the nature of the forum, that the banning of a resident from a local politician’s Facebook 
page for twelve hours violated the First Amendment).
165 326 U.S. 501 (1945). 
166 For an example of this tactic, see Mary Harris Jones, Autobiography of Mother Jones 156 (1996) (Mary Field Parton ed., 1925) (de-
scribing how the author had to drive through a creek bed to reach miners “as that was the only public road and I could be arrested for 
trespassing if I took any other”).
167 326 U.S. at 502.
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action doctrine attests, the Court has changed its mind on this very issue. In Amalgamated Food Employees Union 
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, for instance, the Court held that so long as union picketers used a private shop-
ping center in a manner and purpose “generally consonant” with the use the owners had intended, they could not 
be banned from it consistent with the First Amendment.168 In the Court’s view, the shopping center was “clearly the 
functionally equivalent of the business district . . . involved in Marsh.”169 And “because the shopping center serve[d] 
as the community business block and [was] freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing 
through, the State [could] not delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those 
members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises.”170 If Logan Valley Plaza 
were still good law, it would seem that the platforms run by Facebook, Google, and Twitter could easily be analo-
gized to the plaza, and users and advertisers would have First Amendment claims against these private companies. 
But Logan Valley Plaza was overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB.171 There, the Court thought itself bound by its earlier 
decision in Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner,172 which held that a shopping center did enough to make clear that it was 
not dedicated to public use, so that members of the public had no First Amendment right to distribute handbills 
protesting the Vietnam War. In Hudgens, the Court said it was its “institutional duty . . . to follow until changed the 
law as it now is” and thought the rationale in Logan Valley Plaza could not survive Lloyd.173 Hudgens re-read Marsh 
as standing for something narrower: namely, that private entities that are the functional equivalent of a municipality 
cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, wholly restrict the speech of others on their property.174 
From these precedents, two questions naturally arise. First, and reasoning analogically, we can ask whether plat-
forms such as those run by Facebook, Google, and Twitter are more like municipalities or more like shopping cen-
ters. Because I see these platforms as sufficiently different from both (and because I am skeptical of analogical rea-
soning in this space generally), this framing of the issue strikes me as unattractive. Alternatively, we might instead 
ask whether a majority of the current Court is open to finding a public forum well before a company has created the 
equivalent of an entire town. The language in Packingham supports an affirmative answer.
Again, in Packingham the Court “equate[d] the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks”175 and declared 
it “clear [that] cyberspace . . . and social media in particular” are “the most important places (in a spatial sense) for 
the exchange of views.”176 It found social media “the modern public square”177 and suggested it is “[a] fundamental 
principle of the First Amendment . . . that all persons have access” to it.178 This might be read as analogizing social 
media to the company towns of the past. If these spaces are the “modern public square,” they are clearly taking on 
important government functions.
168 391 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1968). 
169 Id. at 318.
170 Id. at 319. 
171 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
172 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
173 424 U.S. at 518. 
174 Id. at 520. 
175 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017) (Alito, J., concurring). 
176 Id. at 1735.
177 Id. at 1737. 
178 Id. at 1732. 
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179 See, e.g., Venetian Casino Resort LLC v. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2001); Freedom from Religion Found., 
Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494 (7th Cir. 2000). 
180 See Douek, supra note 83, at 16–19.
181 See Tai Liu et al., The Barriers to Overthrowing Internet Feudalism, in Sixteenth ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (2017), 
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How Tech Giants Are Like Feudal Lords and Users Are Like Serfs, Marketplace (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.marketplace.org/2012/11/27/
tech/how-tech-giants-are-feudal-lords-and-users-are-serfs; Bruce Schneier, The Battle for Power on the Internet, Atlantic (Oct. 24, 
2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/the-battle-for-power-on-the-internet/280824; Bruce Schneier, When It 
Comes to Security, We’re Back to Feudalism, Wired (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/feudal-security.
182 Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1979). 
183 Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 575, 589.
184 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
185 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). 
186 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (holding segregation not permitted in a private park maintained by city and granted tax exemption); see 
also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (finding state action where prohibited act could fairly be attributed to the state); 
Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (finding state action when “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and 
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One might reply — as these companies always do — that users are just a click away from going somewhere else. 
Two thoughts about this. First, this reply only highlights how open to the public these platforms are. And since Hud-
gens, when courts have tried to make sense of when private property becomes a public forum, they find relevant 
whether the site has been dedicated to public use.179 If people can seamlessly move between social media sites, 
it may be easier to find these sites dedicated to public use. Like walking into a park or entering a shopping mall, it 
is true that you agree to follow some basic rules upon entry, but overall such barriers are low. The emphasis that 
leading social media companies placed on openness and non-bias in their recent congressional testimony180 but-
tresses this point. Second, we know that such freedom of online movement would only exist if the costs of switching 
platforms were zero or close to it. But we (and they) know that this is not true, given, among other things, network 
effects, switching costs, and first-mover advantages. Moreover, and as the more analogically inclined have put it, 
even if you do switch, it tends to be a move from one online feudal lord (such as Google) to another (such as Face-
book).181 Like moving from company town to company town, moving from one online feudal lord to another does not 
obviously diminish the sense in which either engages in the functional equivalent of state action.
A separate strand of cases within the “murky waters of the state action doctrine”182 concerns government entan-
glement. This is considered the “category of exceptions that has produced—and continues to produce—the most 
confusion.”183 Given this, how the Court will evolve the doctrine going forward is anybody’s guess. With that said, 
and putting aside cases concerning state action via judicial enforcement of private contractual agreements (Shelley 
v. Kraemer being the apex of this184), the Court has previously found state action when “[t]he State so far insinu-
ated itself into a position of interdependence with” a private non-state actor “that it must be recognized as a joint 
participant in the challenged activity.”185 Relatedly, in Evans v. Newton the Court said that “[c]onduct that is formally 
‘private’ may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as 
to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.”186 
The government-like character of the leading tech companies has been acknowledged by the companies them-
selves. Almost a decade ago, Zuckerberg opined, “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a tra-
ditional company. We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really 
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188 Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 51 (2015). The term jawboning “became fashionable in the 1960s” and 
signifies “an effort by the government, usually the president, to persuade companies—through intimidation, bullying or shaming—to do 
what the president asked in the ‘national interest’ even if it wasn’t in the firms’ immediate self-interest.” Robert J. Samuelson, Trump’s 
Job “Jawboning” May Be Good Politics—But It’s Not Good Economics, Wash. Post (Jan. 8, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-
ions/trumps-job-jawboning-may-be-good-politics--but-its-not-good-economics/2017/01/08/a1496dc2-d44b-11e6-a783-cd3fa950f2fd_
story.html. 
189 I do not mean to suggest that these companies always comply with government requests. Apple’s refusal to unlock the iPhone of 
Syed Rizwan Farook, an American-born terrorist and one of the two people responsible for the San Bernardino attack, even in the face 
of a court order, is just one example of company resistance. See Mark Berman & Ellen Nakashima, FBI Director: Victory in the Fight with 
Apple Could Set a Precedent, Lead to More Requests, Wash. Post (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/03/01/fbi-apple-bringing-fight-over-encryption-to-capitol-hill. These companies have reasons both to comply and not to comply 
in such situations, and users have few ways of knowing what happened one way or the other. See Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: 
The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World 85 (2015). To the extent that we worry about this, an expansive ap-
proach to state action might provide companies an attractive shield against informal government requests.
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setting policies.”187 But governments also hold substantial power over these companies, often in ways invisible to 
the public. Take government “requests” for data, without judicial oversight. It isn’t hard to see what is technically 
a private decision by companies like Facebook (to hand over user data to the government) as so entwined with 
the government that finding state action would be reasonable. Or take the pervasive — and, in most of academia, 
deeply under-appreciated — informal pressures that governments put on these platforms to regulate certain con-
tent: a technique sometimes called “jawboning.”188 The recent congressional hearings and various letters from con-
gressional committees to these companies underscore how responsive these companies are to the concerns and 
recommendations of U.S. government officials, even where the government’s legal authority to demand such re-
sponsiveness is unclear. If members of the public were more aware of all the ways that the U.S. government works 
with and makes “requests” of these companies, I suspect findings of state action would be more forthcoming.189 
 D.  The Takeaway 
As with the editorial analogy, other proposed analogies highlight certain facts while obscuring others. Yet all these 
analogies have prima facie purchase. When it comes to programs that organize, rank, and transmit third-party com-
munication to users, some of what they do is similar, in some respects, to some of what publishers or editors do; 
some of what they do is similar, in some respects, to what fiduciaries do; and some of their functions are similar, in 
some respects, to what shopping malls and law schools do; and some of what they do makes them look analogous 
to public squares or to state actors. The question that everything hinges on is this: Which similarities and dissimilar-
ities are the ones that matter from the point of view of free speech principles?
In the First Amendment context, to invoke the compelled speech doctrine and cite Tornillo as the relevant precedent, 
based on the mere fact that both search engines and newspapers rank and organize content, is to beg this question 
instead of properly addressing it. In asking which similarities and dissimilarities matter from the perspective of free 
speech principles, we are posing a question the answer to which cannot but reside in normative considerations. 
Analogical methods that respond to questions of free speech coverage by noting similarities between different types 
of communication, without examining these underlying normative concerns, are at best limited and at worst mis-
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Blake J. Harris, Console Wars: Sega, Nintendo, and the Battle That Defined a Generation (2014); Adam Gabbatt, Myspace Tom to 
Google+: Don’t Become a Cesspool Like My Site, Guardian (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/dec/30/
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leading. The limits of analogical reasoning help explain why some find the concept of “similarity” nearly useless.190 
Indeed, the very use of analogical reasoning in law remains contested, with some finding it to be the “cornerstone 
of common law reasoning” while others see it as “mere window-dressing, without normative force.”191 As I have 
suggested elsewhere, if analogical reasoning is to be useful at all, we may need to distinguish between types of 
analogy and recognize the limited value of each. 
The above point is focused on the threshold question of First Amendment coverage. There also remains an enor-
mous amount of uncertainty concerning how these different framings, if adopted, would play out in practice. Take 
the fiduciary analogy. Determining to whom these companies would owe fiduciary obligations is far less clear than 
some acknowledge. Even among domestic users, interests will conflict, as we see in debates about these compa-
nies’ policies concerning hate speech and on university campuses when the need for open debate runs up against 
the need for safe spaces. Similarly, while finding these companies to be analogous to public squares or company 
towns might be straightforward in some respects, it is worth noting that neither government officials nor a majority 
of users seem to want these companies to be confined by the First Amendment.193 Returning to hate speech, it re-
mains protected under the First Amendment, yet there has been a steady stream of controversies surrounding the 
failure of these platforms to remove hate speech and the users who engage in it. Users expect a level of content 
moderation that would likely be unachievable by a platform constrained by the First Amendment.194 Even more than 
this, applying the First Amendment would likely mean that each of these companies’ community standard guide-
lines are unconstitutional. If the state can’t eject you from the public square for saying something, these companies 
wouldn’t be able to do so either. 
If the First Amendment rights of users were deployed to overturn content moderation as we know it, I suspect these 
platforms would witness a mass exodus. If I may analogize a bit myself, there is something to be said for the Nin-
tendo way, where systems are more closed and curated. Such systems often end up creating more value for users 
(and persisting longer) than alternatives like Sega or MySpace, which try to be too many things to too many people 
at once, with minimal quality control.195 If the First Amendment really did apply to today’s tech giants, it’s not clear 
to me that they could avoid the latter’s fate.
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IV. Normative Beginnings
Instead of focusing on plausible analogies, we need to think through the normative theories undergirding the free 
speech principle and which of them, singular or plural, we want to privilege when making First Amendment cover-
age determinations.196 Here I will only mention two major contenders — democratic participation theory and think-
er-based theory — and leave it to readers to decide whether these theories or others are what ought to be privileged 
at this historical moment.
Democratic ideals are invoked by many influential First Amendment scholars to explain and defend U.S. free speech 
doctrine.197 Building on this tradition, the democratic participation theory of free speech says that speech must be 
protected in order to ensure “the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which we govern our-
selves.”198 How do we decide what counts as “speech” using democratic participation as our normative reference 
point? We cannot construe the ideal too broadly, such that all parts of social life are part of the project of self-gov-
ernment, for in encompassing everything, the ideal would prioritize nothing. Instead, the ideal of democratic partici-
pation requires us to conceptually divide society into two domains: public life, where we act as citizens cooperating 
in collective self-governance, and private life, where we act independently in the service of our own projects. For 
free speech principles grounded in democratic participation, “speech” denotes whatever forms of communication 
are integral to collective self-governance. Of course, there will be complications at the margins, but the basic impli-
cations of the democratic participation theory are discernible all the same. Free speech principles are not meant to 
immunize all communication against legitimate regulatory aims. They are meant to support the project of collective 
self-government by safeguarding the communicative conduct that is essential to that project’s realization.
With those clarifications in place, the pertinent question for our purposes is which sorts of ostensible “speech” — 
be it algorithmic outputs in the form of rankings, listing decisions, trending topics, and so on — help the project 
of democratic self-government and which do not? At this moment, we can certainly appreciate how troll armies, 
fake accounts, and bots can be anathema to these projects. The economic decisions that companies like Google 
make in determining which ads to run or whether to privilege their own products against rivals like Yelp and TripAd-
visor are, as I said, commercial and need not be seen as worth protecting as “speech” for the sake of democratic 
self-governance, at least across the board.199 That’s not to say that these decisions should necessarily be regulated 
but instead to show why, under democratic participation theory, they could be, without running afoul of the First 
Amendment. 
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The “thinker-based” theory, recently developed by Seana Shiffrin, identifies “the individual agent’s interest in the 
protection of the free development and operation of her mind” as the normative keystone of free speech.200 Where-
as other theories situate the value of the thinker in relation to extrinsic ideals or desiderata, this theory identifies a 
direct and non-contingent link between the value of mental autonomy and the justification for the protected status of 
communicative conduct. Again, however, not all communication is privileged under such a theory. If we prioritize the 
“fundamental function of allowing an agent to transmit . . . the contents of her mind to others and to externalize her 
mental content,”201 then we will need to have special protections for people sharing all of this “content” with others. 
This is part of what makes Shiffrin’s theory distinctive: The expression of thoughts about politics and government 
does not occupy an exalted position relative to the expression of thoughts about everyday life. But crucially, what is 
especially protected in this theory is not communication as such but the communication of the thought of individuals. 
And this will tend to assign a less privileged status to much commercial communication. So when we revisit our key 
questions — whether programs that synthesize, organize, rank, and transmit third-party communication to users are 
implicated in “the fundamental function of allowing an agent to transmit the contents of her mind to others” — the 
diagnosis is mixed, as in the previous case. 
One interesting consequence of the thinker-based theory is that, unlike the democratic participation theory, it sug-
gests that facilitation of everyday online chatter by search engines and social networks may be as much a part of the 
case for protecting (some of) their operations as their role in facilitating political discourse. But as with the democrat-
ic participation theory, much of what these programs do — including running ads and allowing for the creation of bot 
armies and the spread of fake and inflammatory news — will likely fall outside the scope of free speech coverage 
by the lights of this normative approach.
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CONCLUSION
In debates over tech companies and free speech coverage, neither the gravity of the policy stakes nor the 
complexity of the things being compared has dampened the willingness of courts and scholars to use ten-
uous analogies in charting the way forward. Most everybody seems to agree that search engines and so-
cial media platforms should be covered by principles of a free press, if and to the extent that the reasons 
underlying our protection of the press apply to them. But the point of this paper is that casual analogical 
methods—observing that both types of things “convey a wide range of information” or “rank and organize 
content”—do not tell us whether or to what extent they do. There are multiple plausible analogies that 
might be used, each with different First Amendment implications, and none tells us whether the norma-
tive considerations underlying free speech coverage for the one apply to the other. But if those normative 
considerations are inapplicable, the reason to extend coverage disappears.
